The greater the proportion of the institutional ownership, the lower the likelihood of tax avoidance usage. The results indicate that institutional ownership negatively affects tax avoidance. The direct and indirect effects between managerial ownership and tax avoidance were tested by using structural equation model analysis. This study uses panel data set of 200 French firms listed during the 2007–2018 period. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the direct and indirect relationship between institutional ownership and corporate tax avoidance using corporate social responsibility ( CSR ) as a mediating variable. In doing so, our study offers an impetus for a broader stakeholder approach to governance research examining CEO incentive alignment. Consistent with our theoretical reasoning, we also show that, both above and below this reference point, the implications of option incentives for corporate tax avoidance are amplified by the level of activist institutional ownership and attenuated by the CEO’s ability to unwind their bond with shareholders through hedging. firms between 19, we show that the implications of CEO stock option incentives are contingent on whether the firm’s effective tax rate is anticipated to be below or above the tax rate of peer firms – an outcome that the CEO can cast as balancing stakeholder demands. Our theoretical framework highlights the role of competing shareholder demands in providing a salient reference point for a CEO contemplating the implications of tax avoidance for their stock option wealth. Infusing stakeholder agency theory with insights from behavioural agency theory, we describe a frame‐dependent relationship between CEO stock option incentives and tax avoidance.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |